BUSINESS GROWTH STRATEGIES OF ILLINOIS FARMS: A QUANTILE REGRESSION APPROACH

This study examines the business strategies employed by Illinois farms to maintain equity growth using quantile regression analysis. Using data from the Farm Business Farm Management system, this study finds that the effect of different business strategies on equity growth rates differs between quantiles. Financial management strategies have a positive effect for farms situated in the highest quantile of equity growth, while for farms in the lowest quantile the effect on equity growth is negative. Cost reduction, asset management and revenue enhancement strategies all proved to have important effects on the determination of growth equity rates.Farm Management,

Analyzing the Mass-Rearing System of the California Red Scale Parasitoid Aphytis melinus (Hymenoptera: Aphelinidae)

Results from studies to improve mass rearing production of the parasitoid Aphytis melinus De Bach (Hymenoptera: Aphelinidae) are presented. Parasitoid production was carried out following standard commercial procedures using an alternative host, Aspidiotus nerii Bouché (Hemiptera: Diaspididae), infesting Cucurbita moschata (Duchesne) (Cucurbitaceae), butternut squash. We found that the initial number of A. melinus adults introduced into rearing cages to start production and the scale/parasitoid ratio in those cages profoundly influenced future parasitoid production. We also observed that scale parasitism was positively correlated with the production of parasitoid adults, but this relationship was negatively correlated if > 2.6 parasitoids per d, per cm2, were used in the cages to start parasitism. Supplemental honey (provided on the squash surface) had no clear impact on parasitoid production or survival, but improved host parasitism. Approximately 47% of the host scale population on squash was parasitized, with another 43.1% of the population recorded as dead. We found that ≤ 10 host scales per cm2 on squash was an adequate density for mass production purposes

A Quantitative Analysis of Tax Competition v. Tax Coordination under Perfect Capital Mobility

Theory predicts that strategically-determined tax rates induce negative externalities across countries in relative prices, the wealth distribution and tax revenue. This paper studies the interaction of these externalities in a dynamic, general equilibrium environment and its effects on quantitative outcomes of tax competition in one-shot games over capital income taxes between two governments that set time-invariant taxes and issue debt. Strategic payoffs correspond to welfare gains net of the cost of transitional dynamics in a standard neoclassical two-country model with exogenous balanced growth. The model is calibrated to European data for the early 1980s starting from a benchmark with symmetric countries. When countries compete over capital taxes adjusting labor taxes to maintain fiscal solvency, the Nash equilibrium replicates calibrated taxes, suggesting that European taxes can be the outcome of Nash competition. When consumption taxes are adjusted to maintain fiscal solvency, competition triggers a “race to the bottom” in capital taxes but this outcome is welfare-improving relative to calibrated taxes. Sensitivity analysis shows that competition can produce a “race to the top” in capital taxes and that the United Kingdom can benefit from tax competition with Continental Europe. Surprisingly, the gains from coordination in all of these experiments are small.

A Quantitative Analysis of Tax Competition v. Tax Coordination under Perfect Capital Mobility

Theory predicts that strategically-determined tax rates induce negative externalities across countries in relative prices, the wealth distribution and tax revenue. This paper studies the interaction of these externalities in a dynamic, general equilibrium environment and its effects on quantitative outcomes of tax competition in one-shot games over capital income taxes between two governments that set time-invariant taxes and issue debt. Strategic payoffs correspond to welfare gains net of the cost of transitional dynamics in a standard neoclassical two-country model with exogenous balanced growth. The model is calibrated to European data for the early 1980s starting from a benchmark with symmetric countries. When countries compete over capital taxes adjusting labor taxes to maintain fiscal solvency, the Nash equilibrium replicates calibrated taxes, suggesting that European taxes can be the outcome of Nash competition. When consumption taxes are adjusted to maintain fiscal solvency, competition triggers a race to the bottom' in capital taxes but this outcome is welfare-improving relative to calibrated taxes. Sensitivity analysis shows that competition can produce a race to the top' in capital taxes and that the United Kingdom can benefit from tax competition with Continental Europe. Surprisingly, the gains from coordination in all of these experiments are small.

Winners and Losers of Tax Competition in the European Union

This paper quantifies the macroeconomic effects of capital income tax competition in the European Union using a two-country neoclassical dynamic general equilibrium model. This model incorporates three key externalities of tax competition: the relative price externality, the wealth distribution externality and the fiscal solvency externality. We consider tax strategies limited to the class of time-invariant taxes and allow governments to issue debt to smooth the tax burden. The analysis starts from a pre-tax-competition equilibrium calibrated to represent the United Kingdom and Continental Europe (France, Germany and Italy) using data from the early 1980s, just before the European integration of financial markets. When labor taxes adjust to maintain fiscal solvency, competition does not trigger a “race to the bottom” in capital taxes. The UK makes a large welfare gain and cuts its capital tax. Continental Europe increases both labor and capital taxes and suffers a large welfare loss. These results are consistent with evidence showing that over the last two decades the UK lowered its capital tax, while Continental Europe increased both capital and labor taxes. When consumption taxes adjust to maintain fiscal solvency, there is a “race to the bottom” in capital taxes but both the UK and Continental Europe are better off than in the pre-tax-competition equilibrium. The gains from coordination in all of these experiments are trivial.

Winners and Losers of Tax Competition in the European Union

This paper quantifies the macroeconomic effects of capital income tax competition in the European Union using a two-country neoclassical dynamic general equilibrium model. This model incorporates three key externalities of tax competition: the relative price externality, the wealth distribution externality and the fiscal solvency externality. We consider tax strategies limited to the class of time-invariant taxes and allow governments to issue debt to smooth the tax burden. The analysis starts from a pre-tax-competition equilibrium calibrated to represent the United Kingdom and Continental Europe (France, Germany and Italy) using data from the early 1980s, just before the European integration of financial markets. When labor taxes adjust to maintain fiscal solvency, competition does not trigger a race to the bottom' in capital taxes. The UK makes a large welfare gain and cuts its capital tax. Continental Europe increases both labor and capital taxes and suffers a large welfare loss. These results are consistent with evidence showing that over the last two decades the UK lowered its capital tax, while Continental Europe increased both capital and labor taxes. When consumption taxes adjust to maintain fiscal solvency, there is a race to the bottom' in capital taxes but both the UK and Continental Europe are better off than in the pre-tax-competition equilibrium. The gains from coordination in all of these experiments are trivial.

Crystal structure of bis-[4-(1H-pyrrol-1-yl)phen-yl] ferrocene-1,1'-di-carboxyl-ate: a potential chemotherapeutic drug.

The title iron(II) complex, [Fe(C16H12NO2)2], crystallizes in the ortho-rhom-bic space group Pbca with the Fe(2+) cation positioned on an inversion center. The cyclo-penta-dienyl (Cp) rings adopt an anti conformation in contrast with other substituted ferrocenes in which the Cp rings appear in a nearly eclipsed conformation. The Cp and the aromatic rings are positioned out of the plane, with a twist angle of 70.20 (12)°, and the C(Cp)-C(CO) bond length is shorter than a typical C-C single bond, which suggests a partial double-bond character and delocalization with the Cp π system. The structure of the complex is compared to other functionalized ferrocenes synthesized in our laboratory